Please refer to the attached file.
Negotiations with the Afghan Taliban have failed to make their regime more politically inclusive or respectful of women’s rights. The diplomatic agenda should be more focused, with issues like security cooperation and economic stability insulated from a main track regarding international recognition of the Taliban.
For more than two years, diplomats from around the world have tried, and failed, to make headway in high-level talks with the Taliban. A large share of the blame rests with the Taliban, who refuse to compromise on their hardline policies on women’s rights or their administration’s lack of inclusivity in exchange for promises of better relations with foreign governments and global institutions. But the impact of this deadlock falls not so much on the Taliban themselves as on the Afghan people, particularly women, who continue to endure one of the world’s worst economic and humanitarian crises, due partly to Afghanistan’s isolation. It is time for outside powers, particularly in the West, to rethink their precepts for how to deal with the pariah regime in Kabul.
After the Taliban swept back to power in 2021, many regional and Western officials kept their distance from the regime, which no country has recognised, but were still able to conclude agreements with it on practical matters that required immediate attention: protection of embassies, evacuation of allies and humanitarian access. Pragmatic engagement with the Taliban expanded over time to include talks about counter-terrorism, debt repayment and trade. Yet the track record of foreign officials trying to use diplomacy and pressure to persuade the Taliban to compromise on women’s and girls’ rights, and a more inclusive government for Afghanistan, is dismal.
The latest embarrassment occurred in February, when UN Secretary-General António Guterres invited the Taliban to meet with international envoys in Doha, Qatar, and the Taliban refused to attend. The Taliban snubbed the Secretary-General partly because of protocol concerns – they wanted to be the sole Afghan representatives at the meeting, something the UN rejected – and partly because they mistrust international efforts to wrangle concessions from their regime. To make matters worse, the failed Doha meeting highlighted the growing rift between the West and countries geographically closer to Afghanistan regarding how to best engage the Taliban. There is little international consensus about what needs to be discussed. Afghanistan’s neighbours have largely accepted that, like it or not, the Taliban hold power and will remain key interlocutors on regional security and economic development, which directly affect their own national interests. By contrast, Western countries are less willing to accept the status quo. Afghanistan is not a priority for Western policymakers, but when they spare a moment for the Taliban, it is often todemand that their regime include minorities and respect human rights, especially women’s rights.
The bruising experience in Doha was only the latest indication that, at the highest levels, talks with the Taliban will not produce results in the short term. No path around the impasse exists at the moment, as neither the Taliban nor outside interlocutors are ready to make the concessions required for achieving a “grand bargain” that would see the Taliban gain international legitimacy in exchange for progress on women’s rights and inclusivity. Indeed, given their current strength in Afghanistan, it is hard to see any scenario in which the Taliban give up their monopoly of power; nor will any modification they could conceivably make to their repressive edicts on gender issues live up to international norms. On the other side, it is politically impossible for Western leaders to offer olive branches, such as lifting sanctions or allowing the Taliban a seat at the UN, without greater responsiveness from Afghanistan’s de facto authorities to their demands. No matter how many skilled diplomats get assigned to bridge this gap, a fundamental divide seems likely to persist for years between the rulers in Kabul and the countries that until 2021 were fighting them.
The best way forward is to keep talking with the Taliban, but to chip away at specific issues, one by one. Even after the Taliban boycotted the Doha gathering, Guterres rightly concluded that work should continue toward the objective of reintegrating Afghanistan into world political and economic structures. He even predicted that subsequent meetings would include the Taliban. “It will happen in the near future”, he said. But all such efforts in recent years have suffered from two fundamental flaws: first, excessive ambition – it should be clear, by now, that trying to radically change the nature of the Taliban and their government amounts to wishful thinking; and secondly, making the resolution of too many urgent problems affecting Afghans contingent on a breakthrough at the top level of negotiations, where progress will happen slowly – if at all.